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THE  ILLUSIVE  “REASONABLE  PERSON”:
CAN  NEUROSCIENCE  HELP  THE
MENTALLY DISABLED?
Ian J. Cosgrove*
[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.
As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new
truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.  We might as well
require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to
remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.
—Thomas Jefferson1
INTRODUCTION
Recent discoveries and progressions in neuroscience have indicated that
mental illnesses and disabilities are largely, if not completely, determined by
biological or otherwise physical processes.  Despite these findings, the law has
been slow to embrace this progress.  For centuries the specifics of mental
illness have remained unknown, and perhaps the distinction between mental
and physical disabilities has remained defensible over time.  Quite simply, the
legal system has lacked adequate tools to grapple with this issue; as put by the
late astronomer Carl Sagan, we have been “bamboozled”2 by the proper con-
ceptualization of mental illness.
The reasonable person standard finds its roots in a time when mental
disability was described by terms such as “distracted” or “lunatick,”3 over two
hundred years before Thomas Jefferson acknowledged the need for legal
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2016; Bachelor of Arts in
English and Legal Studies, State University of New York at Fredonia, 2013.  Thank you to
Professor Kalanges for her initial review of this work, and to the members of the Notre Dame
Law Review for their tireless efforts.  I extend special thanks to Susan McCloskey, and to my
fiance´e Victoria for her never-ending support.  All errors are my own.
1 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 12 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 12 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
2 CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN THE DARK 241
(1995) (“One of the saddest lessons of history is this: If we’ve been bamboozled long
enough, we tend to reject any evidence of the bamboozle.  We’re no longer interested in
finding out the truth. . . . It’s simply too painful to acknowledge, even to ourselves, that
we’ve been taken.”).
3 GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US 5 (1994).
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progress.4  Current negligence doctrine denies any exception from the “rea-
sonable person” standard for the mentally disabled.  It has long been
accepted, however, that those with physical disabilities should not be held to
such a standard.  Today, new discoveries have been made, and we are enlight-
ened as to the nature of mental disability.5  Technological and diagnostic
advancement in recent years has granted new insight into consciousness and
the workings of the human brain.  While our full grasp of these concepts has
not yet been realized, it can hardly be denied that perception of mental disa-
bilities has changed drastically in a relatively short period.6  Neuroscience
gives us the ability to question the bases of a mental disability and continues
to prove that we have the capability to objectively identify the presence of
mental disability.  As such, neuroimaging has shown a substantial link
between physical processes and cognitive functioning and necessarily calls
into doubt the current physical-mental dichotomy in our tort jurisprudence.
New knowledge in the arena of neuroimaging may finally provide us
with the ability to make such determinations a reality in the courtroom.  It is
not surprising that the law has lagged behind our other social institutions in
this regard, but the fact that emerging technologies have been embraced in
numerous fields already7 suggests it is only a matter of time until the legal
profession follows suit.8  In the tort law context relevant to this Note, the
“neuroscience revolution”9 in particular has been recognized as a possible
“catalyst for significant changes.”10  The realm of negligence is fertile ground
4 The origin of the reasonable person standard stems from a 1616 English case,
Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616), although American origins denying a mental
disability defense trace back to the slightly more recent case of Ward v. Conatser, 63 Tenn.
64, 65 (1874).
5 The term “mental disability” is meant to encompass those that include significant
cognitive impairment, duly traceable to an underlying physical or biological cause.  Exam-
ples, which will be discussed below, include schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, and signifi-
cant mental retardation.
6 See the Supreme Court’s unfortunate decision in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927),
where the Court upheld forced sterilization of the mentally ill.
7 Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How
Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235,
237 (2012) (“Society is now in the midst of the technological revolution, with impacts
already felt in intellectual property law, procedural law, and constitutional law, with many
more certain to come.”); Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility
but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1103–04 (2008) (focusing on the criminal law con-
text but noting that “advances in neuroscience will change, dramatically, the criminal jus-
tice system”).
8 See Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 29 & n.11
(2010) (“All share the belief that the impact of neuroscience on the law in the coming
years will be inevitable, dramatic, and will fundamentally alter the way the law does
business.”).
9 See Eggen & Laury, supra note 7, at 237 & n.6 (“[T]he term ‘new neuroscience’ . . .
encompass[es] the various technologies used by neuroscientists to identify and interpret
brain activity. . . . [T]he term ‘new neuroscience’ [is] broad enough to include structural
neuroimaging and the study of brain waves . . . .”).
10 Id. at 237.
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for significant change, and a relatively simple solution to the disparity
between treatment of the mentally disabled vis-a`-vis those with physical infir-
mities is right under our feet.
This Note argues that the distinction between what constitutes a physical
versus a mental disability can no longer rationally be sustained.  Specifically,
its purpose is to show that providing an exception to the “reasonable per-
son”11 standard in negligence actions for the physically disabled12 while with-
holding it for those with mental infirmities13 is increasingly indefensible.
Part I briefly tracks the origins of the current rule in tort law that holds the
mentally and physically disabled to separate standards.  This discussion is
purposely left short because of the breadth of scholarship tracing the stan-
dard.14  Part II seeks to justify, through neuroscientific brain imaging evi-
dence, the claim that numerous disabilities are fundamentally the same
regardless of their label as either mental or physical.  Additionally, Part II
explores the “traditional” justifications for the current rule and attempts to
undermine those rationales in light of these findings.  Part III concludes with
a rather straightforward remedy for this distinction without a difference that
does away with the logical inconsistencies of treating the disabled in two sepa-
rate subsets.  This proposal, as already suggested, is fueled by the recently
developed ability to identify and substantiate the existence of a mental disa-
bility.  The proposed solution incorporates both a subjective and objective
element that will allow courts to analyze the merits of a mental disability
exception without major disruption in the administrative and procedural
course of negligence litigation.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
Current doctrine holds mentally disabled individuals to the same reason-
able, prudent person standard as those of sound mind.  In other words, evi-
dence that an alleged tortfeasor is or was mentally disabled is not factored
into the equation of whether the defendant acted with ordinary care under
the circumstances.15  Standing in stark contrast, evidence of a person’s physi-
11 See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 7 (2014) (“[N]egligence consists of acting other
than as a reasonable person would do in the circumstances . . . .”).
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 11(a) (AM. LAW INST.
2010) (“The conduct of an actor with a physical disability is negligent only if the conduct
does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person with the same disability.” (emphasis
added)).
13 Id. § 11(c) (“An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in deter-
mining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.”).
14 See, e.g., Okianer Christian Dark, Tort Liability and the “Unquiet Mind”: A Proposal to
Incorporate Mental Disabilities into the Standard of Care, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 169, 176–80
(2004); Harry J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 3–6 (1995); Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in
Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J. 153, 154–58 (1983).
15 Korrell, supra note 14, at 6 (“The current rule . . . does not allow the consideration
of evidence that would distinguish those cases in which the defendant truly was unable to
conform his conduct to the standard required from those in which the defendant’s disabil-
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cal disabilities—however that term may be defined—is routinely taken into
account and often works as a complete defense to a finding of negligence.
While the line is undoubtedly difficult to draw, it is clear that at the time of
this doctrine’s genesis, physical and mental infirmities were considered
entirely distinct.16
Invariably, the distinction is traced back to the case of Weaver v. Ward.17
The English court in that case gave no justification or rationale for the dis-
tinction, presumably because of the sparse knowledge of mental disabilities
and illnesses.  Seventeenth-century courts were ill-equipped to give claims of
mental disability much credence because of this lack of knowledge.18  In any
event this doctrine seeped into American jurisprudence and is traced back to
Williams v. Hays19 and Ward v. Conatser,20 both of which applied the objective
negligence standard despite recognition of the defendant’s mental infirmi-
ties.  Thus, from the English courts in 1616 through to the present day,
mental disability “cannot be looked to as a justification” in negligence
cases.21
The same has never been true, however, for those with categorically
physical disabilities.22  In cases where an alleged tortfeasor is encumbered by
ity played no role.”).  Curiously enough, courts in some instances will consider the mental
particularities of an individual if the individual is a child, or if the mentally disabled party is
a plaintiff in a negligence action for contributory liability purposes. See Lynch v. Rosenthal,
396 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Baldwin v. City of Omaha, 607 N.W.2d 841 (Neb.
2000); Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 163 (N.J. 1988); Stacy v. Jedco Constr., Inc., 457
S.E.2d 875, 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
16 See Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
17 Id.  The language eventually used to suggest that mental disabilities are not consid-
ered in evaluating a tort claim is dicta.  The holding in Weaver itself was premised essen-
tially on a theory of strict liability—far different from our allegedly fault-based regime
today.
18 This is evidenced by the fact that a person with a supposed mental disability was
routinely dismissed as “insane.” See Dark, supra note 14, at 179 n.54.
19 38 N.E. 449 (N.Y. 1894).
20 63 Tenn. 64 (1874).
21 Id. at 65. Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970), is
one of only a few cases taking into account the mental disabilities of the defendant.  The
Breunig court wrote that “a sudden mental incapacity equivalent in its effect to . . . physical
causes . . . should be treated alike and not under the general rule of insanity.” Id. at 624.
But even this has been seen as an exception rather than a change in stance, because the
court so held only for sudden incapacitations. See id.  The reasoning leads one to again
wonder why a mental incapacity “equivalent in its effects” to a physical incapacity should
ever be treated differently—especially if, as will be shown, the causes of the incapacity are
innately physical.
22 The First Restatement implicitly acknowledged some difficulty grappling with this
standard, but as later revisions show, this subtle hint of change has also died out. Compare
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (“The Institute expresses no
opinion as to whether insane persons are required to conform to the standard of beha-
viour which society demands of sane persons for the protection of the interests of
others.”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Unless
the actor is a child, his insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from
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a physical disability, courts have nearly universally allowed such a personal
characteristic to affect the outcome.23  An alleged tortfeasor experiencing
schizophrenic traits or even a person with Down’s syndrome (an indisputably
physical mutation of the human genome) is held to an objective standard.
But if the person is physically disabled, for example, by blindness, then “that
person’s conduct is compared to” the reasonable person “with blindness.”24
This is so because requiring a disabled person to act as though the disability
does not exist is “asking for the impossible.”25  Why doctrine has in turn
asked the impossible of those with mental disabilities is not clear.  What is
clear is that the standard has been propped up by policy rationales—the lead-
ing of which for our purposes concerns proof of a mental disability—that are
difficult to justify in our technological age.26
Twentieth-century American courts have on occasion had to apply this
standard to negligence cases involving automobile accidents.  Such has been
the case even though the defendant was concededly “incompetent” to assess
the risks of their actions.27  The language used by the Supreme Court of
Colorado in the 1961 case of Johnson v. Lambotte is particularly perplexing:
the defendant was “mentally incapable . . . and did not have the required
mental capacity to realize the risk involved to herself and others” but none-
theless was liable for negligently operating the car.28  This passage highlights
the incongruence of holding the mentally disabled to a strictly objective stan-
dard, for negligence by its very definition involves a risk of which the defen-
dant should have been aware.29  If the standard is one that the defendant
liability for conduct which does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under
like circumstances.”), and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 11(c)
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in
determining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.”).
23 See, e.g., Mem’l Hosp. v. Scott, 300 N.E.2d 50, 56 (Ind. 1973) (“The proper test to be
applied in such cases is the test of a reasonable man under the same disabilities and infirmities
in like circumstances.”).
24 Dark, supra note 14, at 175.  These determinations have largely turned on a percep-
tual dichotomy between infirmities of the body versus infirmities of the mind, and the
assumption that the workings of the brain are those merely of the mind, not the body.
Consider blindness: a damaged retina is undoubtedly evidence of a physical cause of
potential blindness; but should a person who is blind not because of damage to the physi-
cal structure of the eye but because of abnormalities in the functioning of the occipital
lobe of the brain, be considered a mentally or a physically disabled individual?  The answer
is not so clear.
25 Id.
26 These will be tackled below in Section II.D.
27 See, e.g., Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1961); Gossett v. Van Egmond,
155 P.2d 304 (Or. 1945); Ramey v. Knorr, 124 P.3d 314, 316 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
28 Lambotte, 363 P.2d at 166.
29 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 31, at 169 (5th ed.
1984) (“[T]he essence of negligence is . . . behavior which should be recognized as involv-
ing unreasonable danger to others.”); see also Anne Ruth Mackor, What Can Neurosciences
Say About Responsibility?, in NEUROSCIENCE AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 53, 59 (Nicole A. Vin-
cent ed., 2013) (“Holding someone accountable for his behavior presupposes that he is
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cannot possibly attain, then in effect the current rule works in practice as a
rule of strict liability.30  No mentally disabled defendant can meet such a
threshold and therefore they will always lose, regardless of culpability.  This
proposition is by no means novel, as courts and scholars alike have recog-
nized this logical misstep as deeply troubling.31
On occasion, courts have adopted an exception to the objective standard
where the defendant is suddenly incapacitated by a mental disability.32  How-
ever, this limited exception appears to be premised on the fact that a sudden,
unwarned incapacity “renders [them] incapable of conforming to the stan-
dards of ordinary care,”33 rather than a perception of mental disability in
itself.  In Ramey v. Knorr, the defendant was found liable and incurred a half-
million dollar judgment for her negligence in operating a motor vehicle.
The defendant was a diagnosed schizophrenic and allegedly suffered a schiz-
ophrenic episode while driving.  The court held that there was “no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis” for the jury to find that the defendant was enti-
tled to the sudden incapacitation defense because her incapacitation was
foreseeable.34  And yet while recognizing that a mental disability has the
capability to “render[ ] [a defendant] incapable of conforming to the stan-
dards of ordinary care,”35 the court nonetheless applied a standard of care
that the defendant was incapable of meeting.  Why the Ramey court would
have considered the defendant’s mental disability for a suddenly mentally
incapacitated defendant, but not for the mentally disabled in general, was
dismissed because of “historical and other reasons.”36  The court relied on
policy rationales, most notably the belief that “the existence and degree of
capable of being held accountable. . . . We normally assume adults to have this capacity
unless there are indications that someone does not have it, such as when someone shows
symptoms that he suffers from acute psychosis or that he is severely mentally retarded.”
(emphases added)).
30 See Kristin Harlow, Note, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: How Tort
Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733, 1735 (2007) (“By
effectively requiring a strict liability standard for defendants who have a mental (as
opposed to a physical) illness . . . the common law . . . [is] perpetuating stereotypes and
misunderstanding about the mentally ill population.”).
31 See, e.g., Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348 (Kan. 1927); Goff v. Taylor, 708 S.W.2d 113, 115
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Dorais v. Paquin, 304 A.2d 369, 371 (N.H. 1973) (noting that, at least
for children, a more subjective standard is appropriate because of the “basic unfairness of
predicating legal fault upon a standard which most children are simply incapable of meet-
ing”); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 100 (Belknap Press 2009)
(1881) (“[I]f insanity of a pronounced type exists, manifestly incapacitating the sufferer
from complying with the rule which he has broken, good sense would require it to be
admitted as an excuse.”).
32 See, e.g., Jankee v. Clark Cty., 612 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 2000); Breunig v. American
Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970).
33 Ramey v. Knorr, 124 P.3d 314, 316 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Jankee, 612
N.W.2d at 312).
34 Ramey, 124 P.3d at 316.
35 Id. (quoting Jankee, 612 N.W.2d at 312).
36 Ramey, 124 P.3d at 317.
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one’s mental illness can be difficult to measure and is a major obstacle for
applying a mental deficiency defense.”37
Despite an ever-increasing line of scholarship recognizing the standard’s
incongruence with fundamental tort principles,38 the objective “reasonable
person” appears to have entrenched itself beyond dispute.39  The sparse flick-
ers of judicial alteration have been snuffed out before they gathered steam.40
Such entrenchment is exemplified by Burch v. American Family Mutual Insur-
ance Co., in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that although one of
the defendants was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and mental retardation, to
the extent that she “function[ed] at the cognitive level of a preschooler,” she
must nonetheless be held to the reasonable person standard.41  Curiously,
the court endorsed an exception recognized in Gould v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co.42 that allows for the consideration of a defendant’s
mental disability for institutionalized mentally disabled persons.43  The court
did not elaborate, however, on why such an exception is inapplicable to men-
tally disabled individuals who are not institutionalized.  Rather, the Burch
court based its decision “upon the principles articulated in Gould,”44 which in
turn relied on “matter[s] . . . of public policy.”45  Section II.D examines
whether many of these justifications are still satisfying, after analyzing
whether new technologies should encourage a progressive response—that is,
whether the benefits of our new knowledge tip the scale in favor of aban-
doning an entrenched legal doctrine.
II. NEW INSIGHTS: HOW NEUROSCIENCE AFFECTS THE ANALYSIS
There has been much recent discussion of the advances in scientific
information that question the underlying policy rationales.  But few have
gone further to demonstrate how this knowledge can be applied to remedy
the defect.  Most stop at the metaphysical level, demonstrating the “link
between mental, and organic or physical causes.”46  This Part seeks to carry
37 Id.
38 See Korrell, supra note 14, at 5 n.13 for an extensive gathering of literature on
whether the rule aligns with the underlying principle of fault in our tort regime.
39 See Vosnos v. Perry, 357 N.E.2d 614, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (“However justly this
doctrine may have been originally subject to criticism . . . it is now too firmly supported by
the weight of authority to be disturbed.” (quoting McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill.
1887))).  Indeed, almost all jurisdictions unflinchingly apply this general standard and do
not factor mental disability into the equation for negligence or intentional tort actions. See
Dark, supra note 14, at 170 & n.5, 171 n.10.
40 See Korrell, supra note 14, at 4 & n.10.
41 Burch v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 277, 278, 280 (Wis. 1996).
42 543 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1996).
43 Burch, 543 N.W.2d at 280.
44 Id.
45 Gould, 543 N.W.2d at 284.  Notably, the Gould court acknowledged that the “origins
of this rule” are traced to “a time when strict liability controlled.” Id.
46 Dark, supra note 14, at 172.
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the discussion one step further, by demonstrating that this knowledge can
now be practically applied for evidentiary purposes.47
Undoubtedly a contributing factor in the law’s refusal to tackle the
underlying nature of mental illness and disability is the fact that rapid devel-
opment of scientific neurological procedures has only been available for the
past few decades.  At least since the (in)famous account of Phineas Gage in
1848, there have been subtle indications that the physical attributes of the
brain can lead to or cause certain psychological or behavioral responses.48
But the difference between physical injuries resulting in reduced cognitive
function and the conceptualization of cognitive functions as physical in them-
selves is a subtle one, which we have only recently begun to understand.49
Recognizing the difference may have the force to finally dismantle this
entrenched doctrine.
In the 1970s, neurological imaging techniques analyzing the structure
and function of the human brain became available for clinical usage.50  Only
as recently as the 1990s were noninvasive technologies available to image
brain function.51  Today, however, we have a multitude of technologies at
our disposal that have revolutionized our understanding of the brain’s func-
tionality and the correlative structural links.  Computed axial tomography
(CAT), single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), positron
emission tomography (PET), functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI), and others are among this group of newly developed and rapidly
advancing procedures.  While none of these techniques has been perfected
beyond fault—due largely in part to the fact that they still require expert
47 See id. at 181 (“The issue is not whether this material is complex but rather whether
it is available for the courts to use and rely upon in assessing liability.”).
48 Hans J. Markowitsch & Angelica Staniloiu, Neuroscience, Neuroimaging and the Law, 47
CORTEX 1248, 1248 (2011).
49 In the name of clarity, this is not intended to evolve into a discussion about dualism
or its rejection.  While non-dualist philosophy may add to the discussion on a metaphysical
level, a rejection of traditional dualism is not necessary to support these arguments. See
Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The Practical and the Philosophical, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 34,
38 (2005) (“[A]s neuroscience advances, more and more of human thought, feeling and
action is being explained in terms of the functioning of the brain, a physical organ of the
body . . . . Nevertheless, such models do not seriously threaten our intuitively ‘dualist’ view
of mind and brain.”).  It suffices for our purposes to say that “[m]ind is nothing more than
a term we employ to describe some of the functions of the brain.” RICHARD M. RESTAK,
THE BRAIN 343 (1984).  Nonetheless, for an insightful analysis of dualism’s place in our
jurisprudence, see generally Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Dualism and Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. 975
(2015).
50 Stephen J. Morse, The Future of Neuroscientific Evidence, in THE FUTURE OF EVIDENCE
137, 137 (Carol Henderson & Jules Epstein eds., 2011).  Examples of these procedures
include CT, MRI, and PET.  All have had a cognizable impact on our understanding of the
relation between physical brain attributes and the psychological and behavioral aspects of
the individual.
51 Id. The technique, fMRI, “has led to astonishing advances in our understanding of
the relation of brain to behavior.” Id.
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interpretation of the results52—there is little room to deny that advances in
neuroscience “will have an impact.”53
In order to analyze what this impact might be and the magnitude of
change it could bring forth, this Section will consider the capabilities of two
neuroimaging procedures—PET and fMRI—and their ability to detect indi-
cia of mental disability.  Specifically, this Section will demonstrate how
neuroimaging technology has allowed us to further understand the underly-
ing etiology of certain mental disabilities and what these findings might
mean for our understanding.  Ultimately, this investigation will suggest that
based on newly discovered evidence the distinction between physical and
mental disabilities is one without a difference, and thus cannot rationally be
sustained by our tort system.  Again, the point is not that mental disabilities
are merely like physical ones, but rather that mental disabilities are physical
in nature.
Positron Emission Tomography is a procedure that tracks the oxidation
of glucose in the brain,54 a decidedly biological and physiological process, by
“tagging” blood with a radioactive substance.55  Through this process, cogni-
tive brain activity can be attributed to highly oxygenated blood flow in the
brain.  When that blood is tagged with the radioactive substance, the break-
down can be used to pinpoint a localized reaction.56  For example, when the
reaction from the unstable O15 molecule (oxygen with fifteen electrons) to
the stable O16 (oxygen with a full sixteen electrons) occurs, a positron is emit-
ted.57  The positron’s subsequent interaction with a nearby electron—which
occurs rapidly—produces two photons (particles of light).58  This interaction
allows us to detect brain activity using PET; within an increase in the number
of positron decays, we can conclude that neural activity is occurring.59
Accepting the assumption that particular kinds of thoughts originate in spe-
cific areas of the brain, a three-dimensional map of the regions of the brain
can be used to show which regions were activated, and thus “associations may
. . . be drawn between these brain loci and thoughts.”60
52 See Eggen & Laury, supra note 7, at 242–43; Erickson, supra note 8, at 31 (“Despite
the claim by neuroscientists that the mind is accessible, measurable, and predictable, there
are good reasons for skepticism on all of these fronts.  Cognitive neuroscience, like all
fields of science, utilizes assumptions to generate its conclusions.”).
53 Morse, supra note 50, at 138; see also WILLIAM R. UTTAL, NEUROSCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM xiii (2009) (“What had previously been matters of interest to only philoso-
phers . . . now seems to have developed to the point at which it may have a direct role to
play in courtroom proceedings.”).
54 See UTTAL, supra note 53, at 42.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 43.
60 Id.
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Despite some shortcomings,61 PET was a great advancement over tradi-
tional X-rays that could merely identify structure.  A newer, less invasive pro-
cedure, fMRI, suffers from fewer of the drawbacks of PET imaging and gives
us the ability to track brain functionality in real time.62  By monitoring
changes in blood flow to certain areas of the brain, abnormal functionality
can be pinpointed.  Increases in oxygenated blood to the active region of the
brain results in a high signal intensity; because the blood oxygenation level is
associated with neuronal activity, the measurements provide us an indication
about how a particular region of the brain is functioning.63  Functional MRI
has already given us “unprecedented insights” into the role that physiological
processes play in forming personal “cognitions, perceptions and judg-
ments.”64  This type of neuroimaging has given us both an “aesthetically
beautiful and technologically marvelous”65 window into the physical func-
tionality of the human brain, and could provide a valuable tool in the court-
room.  Especially allayed will be concerns about alleged tortfeasors “feigning”
illness if this type of evidence is utilized.  Functional MRI generates higher
resolution results than its predecessors, and because it is a noninvasive proce-
dure it can be administered any number of times within a short period—
both factors serve to “enhanc[e] the potential reliability and validity of the
results.”66
What might these types of procedures mean when applied in the court-
room?  The results are mixed.  Many commentators express doubt that
neuroimaging technology can be used reliably to prove the existence of
mental disability.67  Much of this skepticism is attributed to our uncertainty
about the effects of “factors including social, hereditary, environmental,
chemical, neurological, and psychological factors.”68  Despite the complexity
in this area, it cannot be denied that neuroimaging technologies such as PET
and fMRI can help us better identify and substantiate a claim of mental disa-
bility.69  At the very least, these technologies provide us with a basis for elimi-
nating the distinction between mental and physical disabilities on account of
their ability to identify physical processes underlying a mental disability.
While neuroimaging evidence standing alone may not always provide explicit
results, neuroimaging is at least capable of acting as a supplement to psychiat-
61 Id. at 44.
62 Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persua-
siveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 233, 234 (2006).
63 Id.
64 Id. (citing Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in
Moral Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105, 2105–08 (2001)).
65 UTTAL, supra note 53, at 48.
66 Feigenson, supra note 62, at 234.
67 UTTAL, supra note 53, at 222–29.
68 Id. at 227.
69 Sarah K. Robins & Carl F. Craver, No Nonsense Neuro-Law, 4 NEUROETHICS 195, 197
(2011) (arguing that much of neuroscience is “nonsense,” and recognizing that despite
that, “it is possible to infer what a person can and cannot do from what one knows about
the functional and structural integrity of their brains”).
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ric and other necessary medical testimony to arrive at a more conclusive
determination.  Drawbacks no doubt are present, as with any type of complex
evidence requiring interpretation.  But having a better grasp of the chemical
and neurological functioning of the brain undoubtedly adds a missing piece
to the puzzle, and is surely preferable to leaving these factors uninvestigated.
Recognizing the limitations of neuroscience as it stands today is important,
but these procedures are increasingly available to both identify mental disa-
bilities as physical in origin and substantiate claims of such disabilities if and
when they arise at trial.
A. Evidentiary Implications
Advances in neuroimaging provide a window into the physiological
causes of mental disability.  The question remains whether such technology
can be successfully amalgamated into effective tort litigation—that is,
whether neuroscience evidence can be efficiently applied in a civil case to
satisfy evidentiary elements of proof.  Like many types of evidence, in any
given case neuroimaging may prove to be unhelpful or at best inconclusive.
Concededly, our understanding of neuroimaging is not complete, but the
following Sections will argue that we have established a sufficient base of
knowledge and understanding to make neuroscience a working reality in the
courtroom.
Of primary concern is establishing the reliability of the evidence at issue.
Having new evidence at our disposal ultimately means nothing if we lack the
procedural framework necessary to ensure its reliability.  The reliability of
neuroscientific evidence is one of the main concerns that scholars and practi-
tioners have with adopting complex evidence of this sort.70  Procedurally,
there is little reason to be frightened by the inclusion of neuroimaging evi-
dence—as with other scientific evidence, testimony supporting neuroimag-
ing evidence must satisfy both the Daubert71 standard and Federal Rule of
Evidence 70272 or its state-law equivalent.  Because under either test the relia-
bility of the evidence at issue is questioned, there should be little fear that the
application of neuroimaging evidence will result in any more chaos than
other types of expert testimony allowed in the medical, criminal, and com-
plex business realms.  Moreover, the burden of proving the reliability of the
evidence rests with the party wishing to introduce it, and the trier of fact
remains free not to credit the expert’s testimony.73  Basic procedural safe-
70 See, e.g., id.; see also Erickson, supra note 8, at 31.
71 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–95 (1993).
72 FED. R. EVID. 702.  Under Rule 702, an expert may provide testimony as to scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge if: (i) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data; (ii) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (iii) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
73 Feigenson, supra note 62, at 236 (deciding whether or not to admit scientific evi-
dence is “within the trial judge’s discretion”).  At the very least, Federal Rule of Evidence
403 allows for the exclusion of evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.” FED. R.
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guards counteract the notion that the assertion of mental disability cannot be
reliably substantiated.74
To be sure, the fact that neuroimaging evidence is capable of surpassing
elementary evidentiary safeguards by no means ends the discussion.
Neuroimaging will not always provide a concrete answer.  To hope that we
can always know with certainty the workings of such a complex and dynamic
organ as the human brain is perhaps somewhat naı¨ve.  Professor Uttal argues
that a driving force behind increasing enthusiasm for neuroscience is the
“myth” that it can “read the mind” of the defendant.75  Admittedly, we are
not at the point at which “mind reading” in any significant sense can be
achieved; for now, the “mind and our thoughts” are likely to remain “private
and inaccessible” to extensive inquiry.76  Still, neuroimaging can be utilized
to identify abnormal brain functioning or detect specific forms of disability
that may influence the legal responsibility of the defendant—this we are, and
have been, capable of.
B. What’s on the Inside Counts: Mental or Physical (or Both)?
Schizophrenia is a highly documented mental disability that affects
approximately one percent of the population.77  The disability is character-
ized by significant thought disorder including hallucinations and delusions,
as well as significant emotional infirmities leading to social withdrawal and
apathy.78  Schizophrenia in its most severe forms may disrupt “almost every
aspect of daily functioning” and can take a significant toll on the emotional
and psychological well-being of the individual and those caring for them.79
Since its recognition, schizophrenia has been linked to brain abnormalities,
and recent studies have identified the disability as a “chronic brain disor-
der.”80  Doctors Barlow and Durand identify “genetic influences, neurotrans-
mitter imbalances, [and] structural damage to the brain”—all indisputably
linked to physical processes and phenomena—as leading causes of the
disorder.81
EVID. 403.  These procedural safeguards are adequate to guard against the introduction of
such evidence for impermissible ends.
74 Even in states still utilizing the test from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923), which asks whether a technique is “generally accepted” in its relevant scientific com-
munity, there is little room for concern—something that is “generally accepted” in our age
of medicine must to some extent exhibit reliability in order to be so accepted.
75 See UTTAL, supra note 53, at 1.
76 Id. at 1–2.
77 Kiyoto Kasai et al., Neuroanatomy and Neurophysiology in Schizophrenia, 43 NEUROS-
CIENCE RES. 93, 93 (2002).
78 Id.
79 DAVID H. BARLOW & V. MARK DURAND, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTEGRATIVE
APPROACH 477 (7th ed. 2015).
80 Kasai et al., supra note 77, at 93 (“[S]chizophrenia . . . structurally and functionally
affect[s] various cortical and subcortical regions involved in cognitive, emotional, and
motivational aspects of human behavior.”).
81 BARLOW & DURAND, supra note 79, at 507.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL109.txt unknown Seq: 13  8-DEC-15 17:06
2015] the  illusive  reasonable  person 433
Advances in neuroimaging have given us increased insight into the struc-
tural abnormalities associated with schizophrenia and the measure of the
functional outcomes that result.  Technology allows us to pinpoint with
increasing accuracy the regions of the brain that are abnormally developed
in both a physical and functional respect.82  The use of PET scans to investi-
gate the effects of dopamine (a neurotransmitter of the brain) and the exam-
ination of the correlation between brain ventricle size and schizophrenic
symptoms through magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) have been utilized to
identify the presence of schizophrenia.83  Although many of the observable
symptoms of schizophrenia are traditionally viewed as having only “mental”
manifestations, schizophrenia cannot be explained without recognition of its
biological and physical origins.  The Ramey v. Knorr84 holding was premised
on the conclusion that schizophrenia is a “mental incapacity” and therefore
“not generally recognized as [a] defense[ ] to a claim of negligence.”85
Neuroimaging evidence of schizophrenia’s biological and physical origins
calls such a conclusion into question.  Under the current standard, however,
such evidence is barred from consideration at the outset.86  Even if courts are
unwilling to classify schizophrenia as a physical disability, a similar exception
to the objective standard for mental disabilities may have a profound impact
on cases like Ramey.
Alzheimer’s disease is the most prevalent form of dementia in those over
sixty-five years of age.87  The classification of Alzheimer’s as a disease, how-
ever, is somewhat misleading.  The term is employed to identify a “group of
symptoms including memory loss, reduced ability to reason, impaired judg-
ment, and progressive loss of ability to understand either spoken or written
language.”88  Those with Alzheimer’s frequently exhibit severe personality
changes and physically aggressive behavior.  In extreme cases, the individual
may lack the ability to identify who they are and experience misperceptions
of reality.89  Undoubtedly, the presence of these symptoms in a given case
should lead us to question whether an individual encumbered by Alzheimer’s
has the capability of attaining the reasonable person standard.
Utilizing a strictly objective standard in the case of an individual with
Alzheimer’s precludes these factors of the “disease” from being taken into
account in the determination of liability.  This of course is based on the per-
ception of Alzheimer’s as an exclusively mental incapacity and, accordingly,
82 Kasai et al., supra note 77, at 94–96.
83 BARLOW & DURAND, supra note 79, at 494–97.
84 124 P.3d 314 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).  This is discussed above in Part I.
85 Id. at 316.
86 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 11(c) (AM. LAW INST.
2005).
87 Vaughn E. James, No Help for the Helpless: How the Law Has Failed to Serve and Protect
Persons Suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 407, 409 (2012)
(“Almost five percent of persons age sixty-five and older are severely demented, with
another ten percent of that group in the moderate dementia category.”).
88 VAUGHN E. JAMES, THE ALZHEIMER’S ADVISOR 4 (2009).
89 James, supra note 87, at 408.
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one warranting no exceptions.  Admittedly, “no one knows for sure what
causes the disease.”90  Yet we know that a primary cause of Alzheimer’s is “the
presence of beta amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles in the brain,”91
an unmistakably physical phenomenon that is recognized as an integral
aspect of the disease’s etiology.  While we do not know what causes the
buildup of these plaques, it is recognized that “regardless of the cause,
Alzheimer’s is a disease of the brain,” and the presence of amyloid plaques
and neurofibrillary tangles giving rise to the disease “physically attack[s] the
patient’s brain.”92
While much of the disease’s etiology is still unknown to us, it cannot be
denied that neurological exams and brain scans are tools capable of substan-
tiating the presence of Alzheimer’s.  Using neuroimaging techniques has
allowed us to diagnose Alzheimer’s with upwards of ninety percent accu-
racy.93  Given our understanding of the extreme effects of the disease, its
physical origins, and our increasingly efficient methods of identifying these
physical origins, there is little substance to the contention that we should
continue denying the existence of these factors in tort litigation.  Neuroimag-
ing has proven reliable enough to assist in substantiating Alzheimer’s as a
defense if raised by a tort defendant.94  Accompanying psychiatric or
biomedical expert testimony can help ensure its reliability; therefore, there is
little stopping us from effectively taking the symptoms of Alzheimer’s into
account.
Negligence suits involving a significantly mentally retarded party per-
haps best illustrate the inherent contradiction of recognizing only physical
disabilities.  An individual is considered mentally retarded if certain specific
criteria are met, highlighted by the onset of both sub-average intellectual and
cognitive functioning.95  The indicators used to diagnose an individual as
mentally retarded “suggest[ ] an aberration in the normal course of brain
development,”96 an indisputably physical process.  While in many cases the
90 Id. at 410.
91 Id.
92 Id. (emphasis added); see also William Thies & Laura Bleiler, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N,
Alzheimer’s Association Report: 2011 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, 7 ALZHEIMER’S &
DEMENTIA 208, 208 (2011); What Is Alzheimer’s?, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, http://www.alz.org/
alzheimers_disease_what_is_alzheimers.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
93 Thies & Bleiler, supra note 92, at 232 (“[More than] 90% of patients diagnosed with
[Alzheimer’s] are found to have it on autopsy.”).
94 See Feigenson, supra note 62, at 237–38.  As far back as 2006, Professor Feigenson
reported that PET and/or SPECT evidence was involved in 130 reported opinions.  While
the use and receptivity of neuroimaging in those cases varied, “PET and/or SPECT evi-
dence ha[d] been admitted in more than four-fifths . . . of cases in which it ha[d] either
been admitted or excluded. Id. at 237.
95 See Igor Branchi et al., Animal Models of Mental Retardation: From Gene to Cognitive
Function, 27 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 141, 141 (2003).  The prevalence of
intellectual disabilities is estimated to be between one and three percent.  Pallab K. Maulik
et al., Prevalence of Intellectual Disability: A Meta-Analysis of Population-Based Studies, 32 RES.
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 419, 420 (2011).
96 Branchi et al., supra note 95, at 141.
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exact etiology of mental retardation cannot be determined, in cases where
the etiology is known, “genetic deficits rank among the leading causes.”97
The cause of mental retardation is often linked to aberrations in the X chro-
mosome, which in turn may cause alterations in the way proteins and carbo-
hydrates are metabolized by the body.  The end result is abnormalities in the
development of the nervous system and cognitive performance in general.98
Significant lack of development can thus often be traced from a physical
alteration in the individual’s genome (a physical characteristic) and attrib-
uted to a suboptimal (physical) maturation in significant brain regions.
When considering these origins, and the fact that a significantly retarded
individual will in many cases be unable to appreciate the risks generated by
their conduct, treating mental retardation as a strictly mental disability is
highly suspect.
Take, for example, two separate tortfeasors.  Both are disabled due to a
specific genetic mutation or alteration.  The defendant whose genetic aberra-
tion leads to abnormalities in the physical maturation of the brain will be
considered a mentally disabled defendant and will be judged by an objective
standard; the defendant whose aberration leads to an abnormality in the
development of the body, such as deformity of the hands associated with
achondroplasia, will have the benefit of an exception.  The contradiction is
even more pronounced if one considers the relatively common genetic disa-
bility Down’s syndrome.  Those with Down’s syndrome may exhibit both
physical abnormalities and mild-to-severe mental retardation.  By which stan-
dard must such an individual be judged?  Should a separate standard be
applied based on whether the individual’s failure to observe reasonable care
resulted from her physical disability or her mental one?  Such a hypothetical
is troubling.
The functioning of the brain areas marked by sub-average development,
such as the neocortex and the prefrontal lobe—two areas highly involved in
significant cognitive functioning99—can be detected by neuroimaging scans
such as fMRI.  Thus, in the highly unlikely event that a defendant may
attempt to feign mental retardation, neuroimaging provides us with another
tool to dismiss unsubstantiated claims, and support valid claims of the pres-
ence of this disability.  Having the ability to detect the presence of mental
defects is a vital tool that should be utilized by the courts.
C. How Neuroscientific Evidence Affects the Traditional Policy Rationales
The main argument of this Note is that no significant distinction can be
made between physical and mental disabilities.  But it must be recognized
97 Id.
98 Id. at 143.
99 Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 5, 8
(Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009) (“Modern empirical endeavours
support the claim that the [prefrontal cortex] . . . is what makes us rational, intellectual,
and moral entities.”).
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from the outset that mental disabilities possess additional complex dimen-
sions, and society regards them as suspect.100  Mentally disabled persons are
stigmatized because of their possibly erratic or inexplicable behavior.
Accordingly, some argue that a standard opening the mentally disabled to
wider liability is necessary to ensure that other free-moving members of soci-
ety will be encouraged to interact with them; in other words, for the mentally
disabled to be regarded as part of the same communal group.101  Yet the very
reason that social stigma attaches to mental disability is our own failure to
fully understand the underlying causes.102  Because of this lack of under-
standing, the treatment of mental disability has typically been “approached
through uninformed, and thus potentially harmful, medicine.”103  For most
of history we have lacked the capacity to directly inspect the origins of mental
disabilities, and thus “it was only possible to infer mental processes from
behavior.”104
The very fact that our understanding of mental disabilities has lagged
behind that of the physical is largely what perpetuates the perception of their
“otherness.”105  Quite simply—and perhaps naturally—we were skeptical of
what we could not yet fully understand.106  This skepticism is one of many
factors that originally led to institutionalization, on the belief that quarantin-
ing the mentally disabled was the best for all.  We have since recognized that
integration, and not alienation, is the best means of interacting with the men-
tally disabled.107  Continuing to treat them as the “other” serves to perpetu-
100 George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, Mental Illness as an Excuse for Civil Wrongs,
43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 24, 24 (1967) (noting that the “crucial manifestations of mental
illness are behavioral, not physical”).  But such complexity does not render mental illness a
“myth” as Alexander and Szasz contended. Id. at 27.
101 See, e.g., Splane, supra note 14, at 163–69.
102 This is true, in part because “[o]ur understanding of why people behave as they do
is closely bound up with the content [of] our laws, social mores, and religious beliefs,”
Farah, supra note 49, at 34, and it is clear from the current treatment of the mentally
disabled that our laws and social mores are content with treating this subset of people as
suspect.  However, “[n]euroscience is providing us with increasingly comprehensive expla-
nations of human behavior,” and this additional knowledge may in turn affect how our
laws and social mores perceive the mentally disabled.  Id.
103 Thomas R. Scott, Neuroscience May Supersede Ethics and Law, 18 SCI. & ENGINEERING
ETHICS 433, 434 (2012).
104 Id.
105 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1753 (Stephen G. Post ed., 3d ed. 2004) (“[T]hose
aspects of the medical role that appear to be purely technical, such as the labeling of
disease, the specific management of the patient, and the choice of medications or other
treatments, have profound consequences for performance of social roles and obligations as
well as for future life opportunities.”).
106 Id. at 1760 (“Certain [nineteenth-century] diagnoses—such as volitional old maid, vag-
abond, and eccentric character—would be laughable if they had not also been socially
coercive.”).
107 See Barbara Barton, Dreams Deferred, 36 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 13, 18 (2009)
(“Today’s Independent Living movement . . . stresses the barriers to inclusion in the social
environment that prevent full participation.”).
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ate the stigma by herding the mentally disabled into an “individualistic”
group.108  While less onerous than institutionalization, holding the mentally
disabled to an unattainable standard works against the development of
“social cohesiveness.”109  It suggests that those with a mental disability are
somehow inferior to the physically disabled and other members of society,
and therefore inferior protection against liability for the mentally disabled is
warranted to protect others from their actions.  By placing the mentally dis-
abled outside of the “communal group” of society, we only serve to impede
their integration because they are deprived of the solidarity and collectivity
attributed to communal groups.110
The cohesiveness of a given social grouping is related to “the capacity of
the group to normalize the symptoms of mental illness” and has a significant
effect on the group’s social reaction to the mentally disabled.111  Professor
Shuman argues that the best way to achieve cultural normalization in this
context is to bring the mentally disabled to a level of functionality equivalent
to the reasonable person.112  He posits that “[i]f the mentally ill . . . behave
. . . like the normal population behave and rely on the threat of tort sanctions
to shape their actions,”113 they will be encouraged to behave in a more
socially responsible way.  This argument assumes that the mentally disabled
are capable of adjusting their conduct to meet that of the “normal popula-
tion,” a contention that is dubious for those with a permanent mental infir-
mity.  The very reason that an objective standard for the mentally disabled is
inappropriate is because it is a threshold they are unlikely to meet.  Contrary
to Professor Shuman, the best way to normalize the mentally disabled into
the communal group is to reduce their otherness by calling attention to, and
promoting better understanding of, the underlying reasons for why they act
as they do.  The law’s utilization of neuroscientific evidence that helps to
explain the fundamentals of mental illness can thus have a profound effect
on whether the mentally disabled can be normalized into the communal
group.  The use of “cultural interpretations, social roles, or treatment tech-
108 ALLAN V. HORWITZ, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF MENTAL ILLNESS 89 (1982); see also
GROB, supra note 3, at 300 (noting that the institutionalization of the mentally disabled led
the institutionalized to “internalize[ ] the behavioral norms of a hospital community”).
109 HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 89.
110 Id.  A “communal group” is characterized by a high degree of cohesiveness featur-
ing numerous ties between its members and a value system that promotes the group’s
welfare. Id.  This type of social cohesiveness is accomplished because “[t]he degree of
cultural distance between members is low,” id., and it cannot seriously be contended that
the mentally disabled are regarded as members of the communal group if we continue to
regard them as a suspect class. See Paul Hunt & Judith Mesquita, Mental Disabilities and the
Human Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 332, 333 (2006)
(“Persons with intellectual disabilities are among the most neglected—the most ‘invisi-
ble’—in our communities.”).
111 HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 90.
112 Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: A Limited Subjective Stan-
dard of Care, 46 SMU L. Rev. 409, 419 (1993).
113 Id.
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nologies” that effectively “reduce the degree of bizarreness” of the symptoms
of mental disabilities make “exclusion . . . a less likely reaction.”114  Consider-
ing, then, that “the recognition of mental illness is directly related to the
cultural distance between members,” putting to use our advanced under-
standing of what constitutes a mental disability will improve the social cohe-
siveness between the mentally disabled and society at large.115  Accordingly,
putting neuroscientific evidence—with its corresponding normalization
capabilities—to use in legal proceedings should assist our purported desire
to incorporate the mentally disabled into everyday society.
Indeed, it was not too long ago that those with physical disabilities were
regarded as socially suspect.116  Unlike the mentally disabled, however, we
quickly developed ways to deal with, and remedy, many physical infirmities,
thus reducing the stigma.117  While it is true that mental disabilities are
defined by social and behavioral aspects,118 physical disabilities once, at least
perceptually, occupied this same class.119  It is thus our treatment and social
perception of the mentally disabled that serves to perpetuate the stigmatiza-
tion, and a standard that rests on this justification can do nothing to progress
their status.  As our knowledge of mental disabilities catches up to our wis-
dom of the physical, the stigma will in like manner fade into history.120
Perhaps one of the rationales most often raised against modifying the
traditional objective approach to negligence is the administrative burden on
the courts.121  To be sure, taking into consideration evidence of a party’s
114 HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 90.
115 Id. at 91.  This is because the mentally disabled are excluded to a lesser extent when
“both informal resources and normalization capacities are high,” while exclusion is much
greater if both “are weak or absent.” Id.  But see GROB, supra note 3, at 302–11 (discussing
the concerns following deinstitutionalization and the inherent difficulty of effectively inte-
grating the recently deinstitutionalized into society at large).
116 See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., Barton, supra note 107, at 17 (“Currently, the technology behind prosthet-
ics has restored most of the functional ability of people with amputations, thus excluding
them from how ‘disability’ is defined.”); Stacey A. Tovino, The Impact of Neuroscience on
Health Law, 1 NEUROETHICS 101, 103 (2008) (noting that “[m]ental disorders remain
poorly understood today,” and recounting estimates by Mental Health America that the
majority of Americans attribute mental disorders to “mental weakness,” “poor parenting,”
and “a form of retribution for sinful or immoral behavior”).
118 Alexander & Szasz, supra note 100.
119 See Barton, supra note 107, at 17 (noting that prosthetic advancements removed
these individuals from the definition of “disability”).  Further developing our understand-
ing of mental disabilities may likewise reduce “[t]he degree of cultural distance” between
society as a whole and the mentally disabled. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 89.
120 See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187
(2001) (arguing that because of negligence’s central place in tort law, negligence decisions
have the power to not only perpetuate, but create social norms).  Another powerful exam-
ple of legal norm creation is evident in the influence on courts of the Restatements
promulgated by the American Law Institute (ALI)—a supporter of retaining the current
objective standard for the mentally disabled.
121 Splane, supra note 14, at 156 & n.19.
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mental health will produce more work for the courts in a given case.  How-
ever, the number of negligence cases that will require additional evidence
will by no means be large.122  As with any other type of complex information
that a court must take into account, expert testimony and neuroimaging evi-
dence can be routinely applied in order to get these types of cases right.
Administrative considerations also take into account the fact that judges are
not neuroscientists and do not possess the requisite expertise to assess that
type of evidence.  Again, considering that psychiatric, medical, and other
complex information is introduced and utilized in the courts suggests that
this argument is nothing more than a “straw man.”123  As with these other
forms of complex evidence, the efficient application of neuroimaging in the
courtroom cannot be achieved unless it is at least occasionally encountered
in practice.  Refusing to implement a new wellspring of evidence that has a
rather significant potential to be outcome-determinative is simply postponing
the issue, for it is inevitable that neuroscience will have an impact on future
litigation.124  Nonetheless, the introduction of expert testimony and scien-
tific evidence in this context will be more costly and perhaps more time con-
suming in a given case.
A corollary to the administrative-burden rationale is that if the mental
efficiency—or lack thereof—of a given defendant must be taken into account
when assessing liability, then the courts will no longer have the benefit of a
single, objective standard.125  Rather, courts will be burdened by millions of
separate standards.  Thus it has been held that “the actor’s individual stan-
dards must give way . . . to those of the public,” and therefore, a failure to
meet the reasonable person standard is negligence “even if it is due to clum-
122 The National Institute of Mental Health estimates that roughly 1% of Americans are
diagnosed schizophrenics. Schizophrenia, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://
www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml#part_145427 (last visited
Nov. 7, 2015).  While the prevalence of other mental disabilities varies, the portion of the
population this change will affect is small and should not be an insurmountable burden for
the courts.
123 See Farah, supra note 49, at 39 (“[W]e can draw on our experience with other areas
of science and technology, and even our experiences in everyday life, to guide us.”).  What
is more, the U.S. Supreme Court has already implicitly accepted the use of neuroimaging
technologies in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), where neuroscientific evidence had
a profound impact on the outcome of the case, and neuroimaging was explicitly endorsed
in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2768 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  Considering that criminal courts also rely on similar evidence
when assessing an insanity defense, it is apparent that courts are equipped to apply and
process this type of information.  See Farah, supra note 49, at 38 (“[E]vidence of neurologi-
cal dysfunction is frequently introduced in the penalty phases of criminal trials.”).
124 Brent Garland & Paul W. Glimcher, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Law, 16 CURRENT
OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 130, 132 (2006) (noting that Roper “is an example of how lawyers
are already attempting to use neuroscience to persuade, even at the highest levels of the
courts”).
125 Splane, supra note 14, at 156–57 (“[T]he difficulty of distinguishing between mental
illness and other variations in emotional, intellectual, or physical make-up would ultimately
result in a complete erosion of the objective standard.”).
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siness, stupidity . . . or even sheer ignorance.”126  Ultimately, then, “society
may require of a person not to be awkward or a fool.”127  While it must be
conceded that a subjective standard for all would unduly burden the courts
in resolving the administration of negligence claims, this argument suffers
two significant weaknesses when considered in the framework proposed by
this Note.  First, this Note does not advocate a subjective standard for all
members of society, but rather an exception for those with a documented
and substantiated mental disability.  As stated, the relative size of this subset
to the general population will be minimal.128  Second, the introduction of
neuroimaging evidence to assist in substantiating a claim of mental disability
will aid in weeding out frivolous claims and help to ensure that the defendant
is not granted an exception because of clumsiness or stupidity, but rather
because of a recognized mental disability.  This may be accomplished, for
example, by neuroimaging evidence proving the existence of significant
mental retardation, granting an exception only for those with the diagnosed
disability rather than those of merely low intelligence.129  In other words, the
framework proposed by this Note protects against the very fears that this
argument puts forth by necessarily limiting the field of defendants.  While it
is true that no administrable standard could allow a defendant of sound
mind to be an awkward fool—for this is precisely what negligence seeks to
ferret out—society can hardly be justified in requiring a mentally retarded
defendant to not be mentally retarded.
One of the more difficult policy rationales to overcome is the contention
by commentators and the judiciary that, where a loss is suffered between two
innocent parties, the loss should fall on the party who ultimately caused the
injury.  This rationale goes directly to the theory of tort law as a compensa-
tory vehicle to make whole those who have suffered an injury through the
negligence of another.  Indeed, it may well hold that where a mentally dis-
abled individual causes injury to another, especially where that individual
requires supervision, they must compensate the injured party.  The rationale
is a persuasive one that may inevitably lead to the continued rejection of an
exception, as there are few justifiable reasons to hold the public at large open
to injury without compensation.  Notably, however, this justification applies
equally to those with physical disabilities—and yet an exception is allowed.130
There is little room for a distinction on this ground, as a physically disabled
126 KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, § 31, at 169.
127 Id.
128 See supra notes 95, 122 and accompanying text.
129 Concededly, this presents foreseeable difficulty in cases at the margins, when a
defendant has an intelligence quotient so low that they may suffer from retardation.  Pro-
fessor Uttal addresses similar concerns. UTTAL, supra note 53, at 222–28 (“Unlike other
categorical and taxonomic schemes, there are no objective scales that can be used to distin-
guish a marginally disturbed person from a seriously disturbed one.”).  But the burden of
proving the existence of the disability is on the defendant, and a court is free in its discre-
tion to deny a modification of the standard in the event they are not persuaded by the
testimony.
130 See Shuman, supra note 112, at 418.
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individual remains quite capable to injure another party.  Even so, they gain
the benefit of a subjective assessment of liability not afforded to the mentally
disabled.
The proposal put forth by this Note may potentially evade such
problems because it does not seek to suggest a complete defense for the men-
tally disabled.  Rather, as will be shown in Part III, a modified objective stan-
dard will still provide for liability even if a mental disability is recognized and
substantiated.  Such a framework still allows an injured party to recover.  In
essence, applying a modified objective standard rather than affording a com-
plete bar to liability for the mentally disabled should help alleviate the inno-
cent-party concern because it does not deny that a mentally disabled
individual may still be held culpable.  If this is the case, then it cannot truly
be said that a loss must be distributed between two innocent parties because
the mentally disabled individual causing an injury will not in all cases be
“innocent.”  A bright-line rejection of liability in every case is more trouble-
some when faced with this rationale; but recognizing that a mentally disabled
individual may still be able to appreciate the risks he is encountering in cer-
tain circumstances will still leave open the possibility for liability.  Rather than
denying recovery to one party or the other simply because a mental disability
has been substantiated, a modified objective standard will allow litigation to
otherwise go forward while leveling the playing field when a mentally dis-
abled party is involved.  Nonetheless, the innocent-party policy rationale is
one of the more difficult arguments to overcome, as the question of incentive
in allowing this change to occur is in many instances difficult to justify.
To be sure, the lasting influence of these and other rationales are enti-
tled to some weight.  Still, it must be recognized that many if not all of these
rationales assume that we lack empirical ability to identify and prove mental
illness.  While these policy rationales “contain no particular scientific or med-
ical information about mental disability at all,”131 the rejection of their con-
tinuing viability does.
III. A MEANINGFUL SOLUTION
The specific proposal this Note puts forth is this: incorporate a standard
consisting of both an objective and subjective element when considering the
responsibility of a mentally disabled tort defendant.  Namely, culpability
should first be analyzed based on the subjective understanding of the facts as
the mentally disabled defendant perceived them at the time.  Neuroimaging
evidence may factor into the analysis at this stage by substantiating a claim
that the defendant was incapable of appreciating the risks of his conduct due
to an underlying mental incapacity.  If neuroimaging, along with additional
expert psychiatric and medical testimony, establishes that such an incapacity
exists, then this factor may be taken into account in determining what risks
the defendant was capable of appreciating.  Surely, in some cases this may
131 Dark, supra note 14, at 181 (“These justifications are completely uninformed by the
current body of scientific knowledge and study on mental illness.”).
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operate as a complete bar to liability—for example, if the trier is satisfied that
the risks of the given situation were not known or appreciated to any degree
by the defendant—but this will not always be the case.  In many cases, the
outcome under the subjective prong may yield results identical to those
under which the trier is utilizing a strictly objective standard.  Asking whether
the defendant was subjectively capable of appreciating the risk not only com-
ports with general conceptions of negligence, but also provides significant
flexibility for the trier of fact to adequately weigh evidence.
After attempting to construct the subjective perception of the defen-
dant, the modified standard still requires an analysis of the reasonableness of
the defendant’s action.  Thus, once a claim of Alzheimer’s has been substan-
tiated to the requisite degree by neuroimaging evidence and accompanying
testimony, then from this standpoint the trier of fact may question whether
the conduct of the individual was reasonable under the circumstances.132
Take, for example, a negligence suit brought against an individual who
claims to be hampered with Alzheimer’s.  Under a strictly objective standard,
his disability will not be taken into account, and thus his diagnosis as some-
one with Alzheimer’s will have no bearing on the assessment of whether he
exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.  This is troublesome in
two respects because the defendant may have been completely unable to
appreciate the risks of his actions at all—and therefore should not be held
liable based on fundamental tort principles—or, his Alzheimer’s may have
played a significant role in whether he was capable of conforming his con-
duct even though he appreciated the risks of his actions.  In either respect,
the question under a strictly objective standard ultimately boils down to this:
Did this defendant cause the injury to the plaintiff?  If this is answered in the
affirmative, the defendant will lose.  The “standard” of reasonable care thus
becomes rather a bright-line rule, akin to strict liability, under which the
defendant has no hope of winning.  Proponents of retaining the objective
standard have been adamant that there should be no exculpation from liabil-
ity for the mentally disabled; they have not, however, suggested why a plain-
tiff should always prevail against them.  In the case of a strictly objective
132 In substance and form, this framework largely traces that used for the evaluation of
the negligence of a child. See Eggen & Laury, supra note 7, at 266 (noting that the negli-
gence standard for children takes into account the individual child’s age, intelligence, and
mental capacity and recognizing that “[t]his standard is both objective . . . and subjective”).
This parallel seems fitting, especially when we consider that many individuals diagnosed
with mental retardation have the physical and/or functional brain activity of a child.  Mary
Beckman, Adolescence: Akin to Mental Retardation?, 305 SCI. 599, 599 (2004) (“Juveniles func-
tion very much like the mentally retarded.  The biggest similarity is their cognitive deficit.”
(quoting Steven Drizin, Northwestern University)).  What seems less fitting is applying
such a standard in one instance yet not the other. But see Alexander & Szasz, supra note
100, at 33–35 (arguing that retaining a subjective standard for children but not the men-
tally disabled is justified based on other significant legal protections for minors).  But this
seems to work against Alexander and Szasz’s conclusion given that the legal protection for
the mentally disabled is far less adequate. Cf. Hunt & Mesquita, supra note 110, at 333
(noting that significant legal protection is lacking for the mentally disabled).
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standard, only the plaintiff is likely to prevail; in the case of a bright-line
exculpation of liability, the defendant will prevail.
Luckily, as stated, a modified objective approach will not always lead to
exculpation; rather, it will level the playing field so that each side has the
capability of prevailing.  Utilizing this new standard, the trier of fact will first
have to believe that the defendant is hampered by a mental disability—which
they are under no obligation to do.  Beyond psychiatric and behavioral testi-
mony, neuroscience will play its vital role at this stage by aiding in substantiat-
ing a claim of mental infirmity.  In the event that the neuroimaging
presented is found unreliable, the trier is again entitled to discount any testi-
mony as to its validity.  In the event that the trier is unconvinced that a disa-
bility of any kind has been proven, the case can easily continue under the
objective standard and no modification should be allowed.  In the event that
the trier credits such testimony, however, they may proceed to analyze how a
defendant with Alzheimer’s subjectively viewed the situation at the time.  Was
he delusional?  Is there an indication that he suffers from disorganized think-
ing?  Or, was his motor behavior compromised?
This modified objective standard has the benefit of simplicity and thus
should be a relatively easy incorporation into the courtroom.133  Addition-
ally, it affords equal analysis of the disability at issue while leaving room for
the subtle attenuating difficulties respecting the identification of mental disa-
bilities.  Neuroimaging factors into the analysis by allowing us to determine
with greater certainty whether a claimed disability does in fact exist.  This is
based on the recognition that outwardly physical disabilities are more promi-
nent and thus easier for the trier of fact to internalize; yet it still leaves open
to the jury the question of whether the mentally disabled defendant’s con-
duct was reasonable under the circumstances.134  Allowing the question to
remain one for the trier’s determination has the dual benefit of not funda-
mentally altering the traditional procedural aspects of our civil jurisprudence
and, accordingly, making the administration of such claims less burdensome
on the courts.  It also allows for retention of significant safeguards by leaving
the credibility determination of testimony with the trier of fact.  It is not, nor
is it intended to be, a bright-line fix denying liability against the mentally
disabled.  Rather, it seeks to achieve what we have long been searching for: a
meaningful way to incorporate the mentally disabled into society at large
133 In fact, some courts have already applied this very framework in certain contexts.
See supra note 15.
134 The case of People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980), although a criminal case,
is instructive.  The Casassa court, in administering a test for evaluating a defense of
“extreme emotional disturbance” containing both a subjective and objective element,
noted that the test “necessarily leaves room for the exercise of judgmental evaluation by
the jury.” Id. at 1316.  Further, the court recognized that while reasonableness should be
determined from the defendant’s viewpoint, the “ultimate test . . . is objective; there must
be ‘reasonable’ explanation or excuse.” Id. at 1315–16 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 201.3 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft 1959)); see also Eggen & Laury, supra note 7, at
265 (“[T]he determination of what was reasonable in the context of the facts of the case is
for the jury in the first instance.”).
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while simultaneously respecting the individual characteristics they possess.
As was argued in Section II.C, the most meaningful way to give a sense of
belonging to the mentally disabled is not to simply ignore their unique attrib-
utes as if they do not exist, but rather to embrace them as we would any other
characteristic that makes us what we are—human beings.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, there may be many factors in the course of litigation that
either lead to neuroimaging evidence being superfluous or inapposite, and
there may very well be instances in which, while professing to apply an objec-
tive standard, a court may in fact be applying a standard with subjective ele-
ments.  In many cases involving a mentally disabled defendant, the injured
individual may not even institute litigation because of their awareness that
the alleged tortfeasor was not culpable; a jury may nullify a decision which
would otherwise hold a mentally disabled defendant liable; and, as this pro-
posed alteration recognizes, evidence supporting a claim of mental disability
may be considered unpersuasive by the trier and thus precluded from consid-
eration in the assessment of liability.  But in the majority of cases, strictly
adhering to the current objective standard often precludes not only the
introduction, but even the consideration of neuroimaging evidence that
could reveal the physical etiology of a mental disability.  Not allowing for the
consideration of this available evidence contradicts the professed goal of
assessing reasonableness under all the circumstances.
Now that the baseline knowledge necessary to put this framework in
place has been established, the relevant laws and institutions can also move
forward.  Too long has this long-questioned doctrine been immune from crit-
ical analysis.  There is no longer reason to hide behind our policy justifica-
tions to protect ourselves from what we once could not understand.  Instead,
we should take pride that we now have the ability to shed the garbs of our
“barbarous ancestors,” and challenge our knowledge to take that understand-
ing further.  Undoubtedly there are limitations to neuroscience evidence as it
currently stands—but these limitations do not automatically render the evi-
dence meaningless.135  While we may not be able to read the mind of a par-
ticular tortfeasor, we have a window into how that person’s brain is
functioning and how structural abnormalities affect their ability to conform
their conduct.136  Neuroscience will require expert testimony, but this
should not be a surprising revelation, as expert testimony accompanies a
wide array of complex evidence given at trial.  Though judges are not scien-
tists, they are not doctors or expert financial advisors, either.  As neuroimag-
ing is applied in the courtroom, judges and counsel will in turn become
more experienced in dealing with such evidence, and its administration will
135 See Mobbs et al., supra note 99, at 19–21 (discussing limitations on the use of
neuroimaging as evidence).
136 See supra Part II.
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allow for the production of advanced procedural safeguards should experi-
ence determine they are necessary.
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